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Crowdsourcing has recently emerged as a new platform for matching the demand and 
supply between professionals and businesses who seek external expertise for business 
task execution. Driven by the unique features of the two-sided crowdsourcing markets 
(such as auction-style competition on quality by professionals), this study seeks to 
examine how the dynamics of the two-sided crowdsourcing platform affect customers’ 
and professionals’ strategic behaviors and market outcomes. Using longitudinal 
transaction data from a crowdsourcing websites, we plan to empirically examine how 
the participation of professionals and customers, task reward and task completion rate 
are affected by the characteristics of the professionals such as distribution of the 
winning professionals and their reputation. The results of our study are expected to 
contribute to the growing literature on crowdsourcing and provide important insights 
on the design and assessment of the sustainability and profitability of the 
crowdsourcing business model. 
Keywords:  Crowdsourcing, network market, concentration, reputation 
Introduction 
Crowdsourcing is the use of the Internet to make an open call for talents (professionals) to contribute 
their skills under a competitive or collaborative environment to accomplish a task presented by the open 
caller (Estelles-Arolas and Gonzalez-Ladron-de-Guevara 2012). Originating from the intersection between 
crowd, outsourcing and online social media (Saxton et al. 2013), crowdsourcing has become a popular 
business model for organizations to go beyond their immediate environment to seek external expertise to 
accomplish tasks that they could not (or would not be cost effective to) accomplish locally (Vukovic et al. 
2010).  Some major models of crowdsourcing activities include intermediary, citizen media production, 
collaborative software development, digital goods sales, product design, consumer report, knowledge base 
building, collaborative science project, and peer-to-peer social financing (Saxton et al. 2013). This study 
focuses on the first model, intermediary, in which business tasks are fulfilled through individual 
contribution of skill and creativity on a competitive online intermediary.  
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Figure 1 illustrates some common situations that may arise in an intermediary crowdsourcing 
marketplace when a customer submits a task for professionals to compete to fulfill. The ideal scenario is 
when a customer posts a task and successfully selects a professional that meets the task requirements 
(such as Tasks 1a, 1c, 3b, and 4).  A customer can place a task that might not generate any interest from 
the professionals’ side as depicted in Tasks 2a and 3a, or multiple submissions are received but no one 
meets the requirements (as in Task 1b). Professionals also face a myriad of challenges when they compete 
in this market. Professional P3 could not find any task posting that matches her professional capability or 
interest. Some professionals such as P2 might compete on several tasks but did not win any, while P4 and 
P5 both submitted three bids and won two tasks. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the intermediary crowdsourcing is very similar to an online auction except that 
professionals need to exert significant efforts to produce a prototype (e.g., for website construction tasks) 
or even a full-fledge product (e.g., logo, product design, etc.) for customers to review, whereas in an 
auction participants generally do not have to devote effort throughout the bidding process. Moreover, a 
crowdsourcing marketplace exhibits two-sided market characteristics, which include product or service 
complementarity, cross-group externalities, and multi-homing by participating agents (Armstrong 2006). 
The value of the crowdsourcing platform lies in the ability to match demand with supply. The marketplace 
gains higher value when more customers (requestors) and professionals (bidders) participate in it, leading 
to cross-group externalities. Professionals and customers who take part in one marketplace may also 
participate in several others (i.e., multi-homing) to increase the chance of fulfilling a task. Since both 
customers and professionals can be multi-homing, it is imperative for the platform administrator to offer 
incentive compatible mechanisms to retain them. However, because the two sides of the market are 
interdependent, attracting customers requires the marketplace to have a sufficient number of qualified 
professionals, which happens only when there are a large enough number of customers offering tasks. 
This creates a “chicken & egg” problem like that of matchmaking sites (Caillaud and Jullien 2003).  
Given these unique features, the level of participation by both professionals and customers has been 
suggested to be a key factor that drives the dynamics in the crowdsourcing market (Burtch et al. 2013). To 
address the participation issue, prior studies on incentive mechanisms in two-sided markets have 
recommended that the less competitive side of the market should be subsidized to increase the 
profitability on the more competitive side (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rysman 2009). In crowdsourcing 
markets, the less competitive side of the market is the customer side. Rather than subsidizing these 
customers directly, crowdsourcing platform administrators adopt a different mechanism by offering 
customers a refund of the commission fee if a task does not attract a certain minimum number of 
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professionals to participate. On the professional side, unlike the traditional ascending-price online 
auctions (e.g., eBay), the crowdsourcing business model involves professionals competing to win a 
business task (contract) rather than purchasing a product. The task reward is a fixed monetary amount 
and the customer selects a winning bid based on the quality of the work submitted by the professionals, or 
other criteria independently determined by the customer. As such, professionals in a crowdsourcing 
marketplace need to establish their credibility by constructing a high quality prototype or building a good 
reputation through a successful task-winning history. To encourage their participation, most 
crowdsourcing marketplaces will provide non-monetary reward points for those who have successfully 
secured and completed a task. 
These interesting dynamics in the crowdsourcing markets raise interesting and important questions on 
the sustainability and profitability of the crowdsourcing business model from both theoretical and 
practical standpoints. Rochet and Tirole (2006) suggested that volume of transactions may not 
necessarily be the product of members of both sides of the market, especially when repeated patronage is 
possible. In the crowdsourcing context, the volume of transaction increases alongside the valuation of the 
marketplace when existing members make repeated submission and when new professionals and 
customers are attracted to the market. However, as shown in Figure 1, such a possibility may be hampered 
by the fact that there is a non-trivial risk of transaction failure on both sides of the market (i.e., for Tasks 
2a and 3a, and Professionals P2 and P3). In light of the complex dynamics in the crowdsourcing markets, 
we are particularly interested in examining the strategic behavior of professionals, the task reward 
decisions by customers, and the market entry or exit decisions by both participants in these markets. 
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1. How do the dynamics of the two-sided crowdsourcing platform (i.e., transaction history) affect 
customers’ and professionals’ decisions to repeatedly participate in or exit the market?  
2. What are the impacts of reward mechanisms on the behaviors of professionals and their chances of 
winning a task in a two-sided crowdsourcing marketplace? 
3. How do the characteristics of successful professionals (i.e., distribution and reputation of the 
winning professionals) affect new customers’ and professionals’ decisions to enter the market? 
 
Following Ariely and Simonson (2003), this study will empirically analyze a crowdsourcing marketplace, 
characterized by customers placing a task request and professionals submitting bids in response, using 
the framework of entry choice, mid-stage value assessment, and end of auction decision dynamics. The 
results of our study are expected to contribute to the growing interest in understanding and using 
crowdsourcing as a third workforce option after employees and outsourcing contractors. As one of the 
early empirical studies on two-sided crowdsourcing markets, our findings will shed light on whether such 
an innovative market mechanism could allow us to address the gap between the demand and supply of 
skills and talents, and whether the marketplace is sustainable and profitable. It will also offer important 
guidance for intermediaries to design a platform that is conducive to the crowdsourcing business model. 
Related literature 
This study builds on three distinct streams of research: market dynamics on online crowdsourcing 
platforms, online auctions and two-sided markets. 
Crowdsourcing  
Several themes in the crowdsourcing literature yield insights for this research, including crowdsourced 
product and service pricing, participant motivation and platform competition. Although increasing the 
number of participating agents is a fundamental goal of a crowdsourcing marketplace, it is the recurring 
and satisfied agents (professionals and customers) that make a crowdsourcing marketplace successful. In 
addition to motivated agents, Satzger et al. (2013) suggest that other external factors such as the nature of 
the tasks and characteristics of the agents contribute significantly to the success of a platform. Strengths 
of crowdsourcing marketplaces include transaction cost effectiveness, easier labor accessibility, efficient 
matching, high probability of task completion and low market prices; whereas challenges include lack of 
motivation, cognitive limitations of professionals and instruction ambiguity by customers (Chandler et al. 
2013). Therefore, market operators should provide the stimulus for learning the required skills so that 
agents can be kept motivated. However, crowdsourcing platform administrators face a difficult task in 
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determining a fee that motivates customers to place their task request and a reward mechanism for 
professionals to take up a task (Satzger et al. 2013).  In an empirical study of an online crowdfunding 
(which is a form of crowdsourcing) site, Kickstarter.com, Zvilichovsky et al. (2014) found evidence of 
network exchange patterns exhibited through direct and indirect reciprocity by initiators and backers. 
Using data from 85 online multi-player game platforms with unpaid agents, Boudreau and Jeppesen 
(2014) investigated if reliance on network effects and strategies to attract large numbers of agents is 
advisable in unpaid crowdsourcing marketplace. They concluded that network effects had no overall 
meaningful effect. This leaves open the question whether there are any indirect network externalities 
within and between the two sides of the marketplace, and whether findings in related markets that adopt 
a similar business model, such as online auctions and two-sided markets, can be extended to the 
crowdsourcing context. 
Auction Behavior 
Conceptually, product and service acquisitions through crowdsourcing is very similar to those fulfilled by 
auctions in that the auctioneer can maximize its payoffs by pushing bidders to compete against each 
other, and reveal their true willingness to pay (Wilson 1977). Due to competitive pressure and 
psychological factors, it is not uncommon for bidders to make late bids and pay a higher price than their 
maximum reservation price, which often leads to higher profits and transaction volume than what an 
auctioneer would generate in a traditional fixed price setting (Bajari et al. 2003; Hong and Shum 2002).  
Despite their similarities, crowdsourcing differs from traditional online auctions in several important 
ways. First, in online auctions, the listing agent (auctioneer) builds up a reputation through accumulating 
a high review rating for fulfilment of transactions, whereas in the crowdsourcing market listing agents 
(customers) are not evaluated or rated but bidders (professionals) rather establish a reputation by 
receiving points for successfully winning and completing a task. Second, bidders (professionals) in 
crowdsourcing markets are competing for a task (or contract) by demonstrating their talent. Hence the 
chance of winning a task is bounded by how their talent stands out in a competition and not their 
willingness to pay (which is independent across bidders in an online auction). As a result, a professional 
will often base her bidding decision on not only her own capabilities but also the level of competition 
observed for a given task, which is often indicated by the concentration of competitive professionals who 
have had a constant history of winning in the market. All else being equal, if a crowdsourcing market 
exhibits a “winner-take-all” kind of market concentration in which a small number of professionals win 
the majority of the tasks, other professionals will have less incentive to participate in the competition. 
Third, unlike in price-ascending or descending auctions where bidders can submit a bid at no cost, 
crowdsourcing bidders need to submit an almost ready product for customers to review, hence significant 
efforts are needed regardless of whether a professional wins a task or not. Prior studies on auctions with 
entry cost suggest that policies to limit the number of bidders (even to a single bidder) may be welfare 
improving (Samuelson, 1985). However, this finding contradicts the philosophy of crowdsourcing where 
the more the bidder the more likely a buyer gets the required expertise. Due to such a contradiction, the 
auction literature offers very little guidance on how efforts could be made to minimize the professional’s 
concern on the cost of participation.  The above important distinctions from the online auction literatures, 
along with the inter-dependence of the dynamics on both sides of the crowdsourcing market, have led us 
to consider supplementing the online auction theories with the findings from the two-sided markets.  
Two-sided Electronic Markets 
The crowdsourcing market also relates closely to two-sided markets, widely studied in IS and Economics 
literature (Bhargava and Choudhary 2004; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Rochet and Tirole 2003). Two-
sided markets usually exhibit direct and indirect network effects. These effects impact participation in 
marketplace by influencing user willingness to pay, user adoption, and consequently the platform’s value 
(Shapiro and Varian 1999). Some factors that contribute to network platform success include openness, 
extensibility, and modularity and quality control (Eisenmann et al. 2006). Seeking to understand the 
achievement of some many-to-one labor markets despite the numerous challenges they face, Kojima and 
Pathak (2009) find that a stable matching will be realized under a student-optimal stable mechanism in a 
large market since a stable matching is efficient in general. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) proposed an 
analysis of the intermediation market that accounts for such specific aspects of informational 
intermediation as network externalities, non-exclusivity of services, and price discrimination. They 
suggest that intermediaries should create incentives to promote non-exclusive services as this moderates 
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competition on both sides of the market and allows them to exert market power. Furthermore, 
competition always improves consumer and merchant welfare because network profits decrease with 
competition (Chakravorti and Roson 2006). Therefore market operators should invest in creating and 
promoting cross-network externalities for higher welfare. However, departing from between-marketplace 
competition to within-marketplace competition, Li et al. (2010) concluded that increasing the cross-
network benefits of agents might actually lower the profits of the marketplace. Therefore, market 
operators seeking to increase participation on either side of the market will have a hard time creating a 
profitable marketplace. Given some of the controversial findings, and the fact that the majority of these 
conclusions are derived from analytical studies and have not been validated empirically, it is important 
that we examine some of these conclusions using longitudinal data collected from a two-sided 
crowdsourcing marketplace. 
Research Model and Hypotheses  
As discussed earlier, the process of posting a task and submitting a bid in crowdsourcing marketplace is 
very similar to that of an online auction. Therefore, this research will follow the general framework 
presented by Ariely and Simonson (2003) for studying bidding behavior in online auctions which focuses 
on the differentiating characteristics of the auction purchase environment. The framework consists of 
auction choice/entry, middle phase of the auction and end of auction. The distinction of each phase is an 
important factor because a market involving an auction is typically a multi-phase process. In the first 
phase, a customer or a bidder decides whether to choose or enter a particular auction (task), which is 
often followed by a sequence of offers and bids, with a distinctive final phase, in which the customer 
selects a winning bid(s) from a pool of submissions. 
The second phase involves value assessment, which is conceptually similar to a customer’s or a bidder’s 
use of various value cues in ordinary transactions. However, the crowdsourcing environment offers a 
different range of value indicators. The impacts of particular cues, such as the task reward, the bidder's 
reputation, and the number of participants (customers and bidders) are likely to play different roles at 
different phases of the auction.  
The third phase in crowdsourcing market participation includes repeated participation decision dynamics 
which relate to the impact of the history of wins and number of completed prior tasks in the same 
marketplace. An interested professional can evaluate the profiles of other professionals who have 
submitted a bid since the information on the bidding professionals is displayed along with their 
submissions. This interesting aspect of intermediary crowdsourcing compounds the decision processes of 
participants on these platforms. We will examine various ways in which the characteristics of winning 
professionals and prior transaction records of the customers could dynamically impact subsequent 
decisions on the part of customers or professionals. These might trigger emotional reactions, competitive 
behavior, a desire to participate by professionals, as well as a customer’s subsequent task award decision.  
Among these issues, of particular interest to us is the impact of the characteristics of professionals when 
cross-group externalities exist in the marketplace. The variable describing the characteristics of 
professionals is manifested in two dimensions: the concentration of the winning professionals and the 
reputation of all the professionals. The concentration of winners examines the distribution of the number 
of bids each professional wins. Pareto curve, commonly used to successfully describe the distribution of 
income, wealth, and city size (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), is introduced into the context of this 
crowdsourcing research to measure how quickly the disparity in the number of projects a professional 
wins changes as the number of new customers, professionals, task reward or completion rate increases. 
Reputation refers to the average reputation rating of all participating professionals who have received 
points for winning and successfully completing a task. A high reputation rating sends an important signal 
to customer and other competitors and directly influences their perception of the quality of a 
professional’s work and the degree of competition, respectively. Based on this framework, we derive the 
hypotheses of the study and construct our research model. 
New Customers 
Our first set of hypotheses investigates how the characteristics of the winning professionals, as 
represented by the concentration and reputation of the winning professionals, influence the entry decision 
of new customers. In a regular market, the distribution of winning professionals should follow a normal 
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distribution, with the majority of the professionals winning an average number of tasks and fewer 
professionals winning either very few or a large number of tasks. However, due to the unique 
characteristics of the crowdsourcing platform, i.e., first mover advantage, reputation mechanism, and the 
decision criteria of customers, a winner-take-most outcome may arise in which few professionals 
consistently win the majority of the tasks. Therefore the distribution of winning bids is likely to follow a 
long tail distribution as those observed in many other Internet markets (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011). This 
form of concentration of winning bids will have an impact on the level of competition among existing 
professionals and the entry decision of new customers. A platform with a long-tail distribution of winning 
professionals indicates a relatively less competitive market and that the scope of expertise that can 
contribute to a task is relatively narrow. A customer seeking external talent to execute a task is probably 
looking for a crowdsourcing platform that gives them access to a divergent pool of highly competitive 
professionals so that its task request will be met with the highest quality. Therefore, we expect the 
decision of incoming customers will be affected in a way that: 
Hypothesis 1a: The concentration (clustering) of winning professionals in a crowdsourcing marketplace 
is negatively associated with the number of new customers joining the marketplace. 
In a traditional service acquisition, customers will most likely outsource task to vendors with a successful 
track record of similar tasks. Similarly, customers in a crowdsourcing marketplace are more likely to 
source their tasks in a marketplace with a proven track record. The second dimension of the 
characteristics of the professionals, reputation of the professionals, is the rating a professional received 
for successful execution of customer task request. This measure has been operationalized in previous 
crowdsourcing literature as the ability level that measures the skills of professional and is influenced by 
competitive intensity, task reward and complexity (Shao et al. 2012). When a professional wins a task, 
they earn reputation points as a non-monetary reward; whereas if they fail to win a task, certain points 
will be deducted (only up to a certain level). As the number of completed tasks increases, so does the 
reputation level of the existing professionals. A good reputation signals a customer that the professional 
has the needed skills and experience to meet her business needs. Hence we predict that: 
Hypothesis 1b: The average reputation rating of the professionals in a crowdsourcing marketplace is 
positively associated with the number of new customers joining the marketplace. 
New Professionals  
Our second set of hypotheses considers the effect of the characteristics of professionals on the decision of 
new professionals to join a crowdsourcing marketplace. As discussed earlier, concentration of winning 
professionals will send some signals to potential entrants about the capabilities of the existing 
professionals and the level of competition in the marketplace, which will allow them to infer the chance of 
winning in such a marketplace. A skewed distribution (concentration) of winning professionals implies 
that only few professionals repeatedly win the contest for most tasks while a less skewed distribution 
suggests that more professionals have won a task before, indicating greater competition but also a better 
chance of being selected by a customer if the new entrant has the right talent. Therefore, we anticipate 
that:  
Hypothesis 2a: The concentration (clustering) of winning professionals in a crowdsourcing marketplace 
is negatively associated with the number of new professionals joining the marketplace. 
The reputation of existing professionals on a marketplace also has an impact on how a new professional 
views the prospect of the marketplace. Reputation increases with successful execution of task request and 
this could result from repeated winning submissions or unique submissions. An upward trend in 
reputation suggests that most tasks have been fulfilled or the marketplace has the right talents to meet 
customer demands. To a potential professional, an increase in reputation also implies that more 
customers will be motivated to place their task requests in the marketplace. Therefore, participating in 
such a marketplace increases the chances of professional success. On the other hand, a decrease in 
reputation could mean that there is a mismatch between professionals and customers, indicating that the 
chance of a new professional meeting the expectation of a customer is small. Hence we hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2b: The reputation of professional in a crowdsourcing marketplace is positively associated 
with the number of new professionals joining the marketplace. 
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Task Completion Rate 
Our third set of hypotheses considers the effect of the characteristics of professional on the task 
completion rate. A task set up for bidding by a customer may or may not close with a successful bid due to 
various reasons. The task completion rate measures the number of successfully closed tasks to the total 
number of tasks posted by all customers. In other markets, customer feedback has been used as an 
instrument for evaluating the chances of a task request being successfully executed (Seow et al. 2005), or 
the probability of fulfillment in business transactions such as auctions (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007). In the 
crowdsourcing market, successful task completion results in positive reviews and reward points; this will 
influence potential customers and professionals’ decisions to join the marketplace. As discussed earlier, a 
less skewed distribution of winning professionals indicates that there are more talents within the 
professional group on the network marketplace. Thus the chances that a task will be successfully executed 
increases with a less skewed distribution of the winning professionals. Hence, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 3a: The concentration (clustering) of winning professionals in a crowdsourcing marketplace 
is negatively associated with the task completion rate. 
In a similar vein, reputation of the professionals also has an impact on task completion rate. An increased 
average reputation of the professional group indicates a better match between the talents of professionals 
and the tasks posted by customers, and consequently a higher probability of winning. This encourages 
professionals to exert their best efforts and submit a bid to a task request. As the number of submissions 
to a task increases, so do the chances of getting a task to be successfully completed. Therefore, we predict 
that: 
Hypothesis 3b:  The reputation of professional in a crowdsourcing marketplace is positively associated 
with the task completion rate. 
Monetary Task Reward  
Last but not least, our fourth set of hypotheses deals with the effect of the characteristics of professionals 
on amount of monetary task reward offered by a customer. The task reward reflects a customer’s 
evaluation of the value of a task and varies among customers (even after controlling for task type or 
complexity). Even holding the nature of the task and level of complexity constant (i.e., for similar task in 
the same product category), such a variation in task reward amount could be driven by a number of 
factors and in particular, by the level of competition in the bidding process. In the auction literature, 
Kauffman and Wood (2006) found that bidders’ willingness to take part in an auction exhibit herding 
effect because they will be more willing to engage in an auction as the competition intensifies. Hence the 
closing price is usually higher when the bidding process is more competitive. In a crowdsourcing 
marketplace, as customers have their request fulfilled, they develop an understanding of the dynamics of 
the market and the characteristics of professionals bidding on a task.  If the market has evolved into a 
state in which the majority of the bids are won by a small group of professionals, it will inevitably lead to a 
higher concentration of winning professionals, which in turn leads to a less competitive bidding process as 
fewer professional will be willing to participate in a biding in which the chance of winning is relatively 
small (due to the existence of those frequent winners). If such a scenario arises, customers will have to 
increase the award amount to encourage more participation. On the contrary, if the bidding process is 
more competitive (e.g. the concentration of the winning professionals is small), then customers will be 
able to benefit from competition by lowering the award amount. In the long run, such a learning effect will 
also be extended to new customers as they observe what others offer for a similar task before they set their 
task award amount.  Thus, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 4a:  The concentration (clustering) of winning professional in a crowdsourcing marketplace 
is positively associated with the average monetary reward for task offered by customers. 
From the customer’s perspective, it is always desirable to lower the monetary reward for their tasks. But 
an experienced customer is also aware of the fact that the reward for a task influences the level of 
participation in crowdsourcing (DiPalantino and Vojnovic 2009) and will therefore exercise their power 
carefully. A repeated customer in a crowdsourcing marketplace who has had some tasks completed before 
will rationally adapt their price setting strategy based on the ability of the professionals observed in the 
market, which is often indicated by the professional reputation ratings. When the overall reputation of the 
professional group increases, it indicates less uncertainty, a better match between prior customer requests 
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and the talents of professionals, and a higher quality of work submitted by these experienced 
professionals. Experienced customers will therefore take advantage of this market benefit and lower the 
award amount for their tasks. As repeated customers play a major role in shaping the evolution of the 
market, we expect that: 
H4b:  The reputation of professionals in a crowdsourcing marketplace is negatively associated with the 
average monetary task reward offered by repeated customers, and such an effect is more significant 









Figure 2 above illustrates the conceptual framework for our future empirical analysis and summarizes the 
eight hypotheses, along with the predicted directions of the associations between the characteristics of 
professionals and task characteristics, and market participants’ (customers’ and professionals’) decisions 
to enter the market. 
Data and Plan for Empirical Analysis 
In this study we seek to understand the market dynamics at both the market participant (customers and 
professionals) level and the project level. A longitudinal quantitative methodology is chosen for this study 
as data will be gathered on a weekly basis for all of the variables involved in our hypotheses. Using a 
software agent, we are in the process of collecting data from a crowdsourcing website.  At the project level, 
we are collecting project-related data on all projects posted on the website in different project categories 
(i.e. logo design, website development, marketing slogan, etc.) from 2008 to 2015, which will allow us to 
construct a dataset with more than 33,000 projects over a seven-year period. At the market participant 
level, we will collect the demographics and other individual characteristics of both customers and 
professionals (6392) who have participated in the afore-mentioned projects. On the customer side, we will 
collect the description of a task including the name of the customer, date posted, reward amount, the 
number of bids, information on each bidder, the outcome of the task request (completed or not), the id of 
the winning bid; on the professional side, we will collect data on the professional’s id, activity history, user 
profile, number of bids submitted, number of winning bids, and reputation rating. These data will allow 
us to assemble a panel dataset in which the projects differ in their product category (i), the customer who 
posts the project (j) and time (t) dimension. This rich dataset will be able to capture the dynamics on a 
crowdsourcing platform and help us explore the research questions outlined in the introduction.  Figure 3 
shows a sample page of the data to be collected. A generalized least square regression will be employed to 
analyze the panel dataset. Our data collection effort is ongoing and is expected to last for six months, 
which will be right in time for us to present the results at ICIS in December 2015. 
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Figure 3.  Sample Webpage for Data Collection 
Concluding Remarks and Future Work 
Integrating theories from auction behavior, two-sided network market, and the crowdsourcing business 
model, this study attempts to understand the dynamics within a crowdsourcing marketplace that consists 
of a platform administrator, customers who outsource their business tasks, and professionals who 
contribute their talent to compete for winning the task. We expect our work to contribute to the literature 
on crowdsourcing business model and cross-network dynamics in two-sided markets in several important 
aspects. First, we examine the crowdsourcing model from both the customers and professionals 
perspectives, whereas most prior literature focuses on only one side of the market (bidder side). Second, 
we define and measure intrinsic market characteristics such as professional’s profile and distribution and 
composition of both customers (buyers) and professionals (bidders) and examine how these factors 
change the competitive behaviors of the participants in the crowdsourcing market. Third, our work 
extends the online auctions literature by empirically examining how the reputation mechanism adopted in 
online auctions for sellers can be applied to crowdsourcing context for professionals (bidders) and how 
such an evaluation system can influence the market outcome. To the best of our knowledge, our study is 
among the first empirical work on the dynamics of the crowdsourcing market. Our results will provide 
important guidance for policy makers and crowdsourcing market administrators on how to design a 
sustainable market structure that is compatible with the interests of all participating agents. It will also 
shed light on how market participants can maximize their payoffs through observation and analysis of 
market signals and participant characteristics.  
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